Unitary t-designs are the bread and butter of quantum information theory and beyond. An important issue in practice is that of efficiently constructing good approximations of such unitary t-designs. Building on results by Aubrun (Comm. Math. Phys. 2009), we prove that sampling d t poly(t, log d, 1/ ) unitaries from an exact t-design provides with positive probability an -approximate t-design, if the error is measured in one-to-one norm distance of the corresponding t-twirling channels. As an application, we give a partially derandomized construction of a quantum encryption scheme that has roughly the same key size and security as the quantum one-time pad, but possesses the additional property of being non-malleable against adversaries without quantum side information.
Introduction
Random unitaries, drawn from the Haar measure on the unitary group, play an important role in many aspects of theoretical quantum information science. For instance, most results on quantum source and channel coding are obtained with Haar-random coding strategies [HHWY08, ADHW09, BCR11] using the decoupling technique [HOW07, SDTR13, DBWR14, MBD + 17]. The columns and rows of Haar random unitaries are Haar random unit vectors and have also found many applications in quantum information theory, e.g. for constructing quantum money schemes [JLS18, AMR19] . However, it is infeasible in practice to even just approximate Haar random unitaries, the randomness and number of gates necessary to sample and implement them being exponential in the number of qubits they act on.
In most situations, unitary t-designs, the quantum analogues of t-wise independent functions, come to the rescue [DCEL09] . A unitary t-design is a measure on the unitary group that reproduces the Haar measure up to the t-th moment. This means that a random unitary sampled from a t-design can replace a Haar-random unitary in any situation where it is only applied t times. For practical purposes, one would like this measure to be more economical than the Haar measure (for instance to have finite, as small as possible, support). Often even approximate versions of unitary t-designs (in the right metrics) are already sufficient. In quantum information theory and related fields the most common metric between measures on the unitary group is the completely bounded one-to-one norm, or diamond norm, on the induced t-twirling channels. The t-twirling channel associated to a measure is the channel that can be implemented by sampling a unitary according to the measure, and then applying it to each sub-system of a t-partite input system.
In [HLSW04] , approximate 1-designs have been studied using a metric based on the (not completely bounded) one-to-one norm. There, it is shown that approximate 1-designs in this weaker sense can be made of much fewer unitaries, and that they still have interesting applications, such as unconditionally secure encryption of quantum data when confidentiality is only desired against adversaries without quantum side information. The former result is shown by proving that sampling a small number of independent Haar-random unitaries provides with high probability an approximate 1-design. This construction was subsequently partially derandomized in [Aub09] .
Let us mention one last result which was known prior to this work. It was shown in [LW17] that, in fact, any channel can be approximated in one-to-one norm by a channel having few Kraus operators. However, this does not tell us whether it can be further imposed that the Kraus operators of this approximating channel are of a specific form (such as e.g. being tensor powers of unitaries sampled from a simple enough distribution, which is what we are interested in here).
Our contribution
In this work, we generalize the approach of [Aub09] to construct small approximate tdesigns, for any given t, in one-to-one norm distance. In addition, for t = 2, we show that the approach extends to designs where the goal is to approximate the channel twirl, i.e. the transformation of quantum channels obtained by sampling a unitary, applying it to the input state before the channel acts on it, and undoing this action afterwards. Here, the appropriate distance is the one stemming from the operator norm induced by the diamond norm, which we call diamond-to-diamond norm. To prove the approximation result on the so-called U ⊗t -twirl, we use basic representation theory of the unitary group, including the Weyl dimension formula, to show that this channel has small one-to-operator norm. This allows us to apply the powerful probabilistic and functional analytic tools developed in [Aub09] . For the channel twirl, the invariant space spanned by the identity, as well as the off-diagonal terms involving this invariant space, require a careful analysis. Along the way, we also construct a design that approximates the so-called U ⊗Ū -twirl, the image of the channel twirl under the Choi-Jamiołkowski isomorphism.
An application
Subsequently, we apply our results in a cryptographic context. We show, that an approximate channel-twirl design in the diamond-to-diamond norm metric can be used to construct a quantum encryption scheme that is as secure as the quantum one-time pad and has (essentially) the same key length, but also is non-malleable against adversaries without quantum side information.
Related work
Unitary t-designs exist for all t and all dimensions [Kan15] 1 . For t > 3, time-efficient constructions are, however, only known for approximate unitary t-designs [BHH16] . The sub-sampling technique that we use, following [Aub09] , i.e. the strategy of sampling (a small number of) random unitaries from an exact design, was first introduced in [ABW09] to show the existence of small approximate 2-designs.
Non-malleability for quantum encryption was first introduced and characterized in [ABW09] . In this work it was also shown that the notion of quantum non-malleability is equivalent to the notion of approximate unitary 2-designs, under the condition that the encryption algorithm be unitary. Subsequently, non-malleability for quantum encryption has been further studied in [AM17, MSvW19] .
Notation and standard definitions
Let us gather here notation that we will be using throughout the whole paper. Given d ∈ N, we denote by L(d) the set of linear operators on C d , by D(d) the set of quantum states (i.e. positive semidefinite and trace 1 operators) on C d , and by U (d) the set of unitary operators on C d . We additionally denote by L(d) the set of linear operators on L(d), and by C(d) the set of quantum channels (i.e. completely positive and tracepreserving operators) on L(d). Let us conclude with some standard notation/definitions from probability theory. Given a random variable X, we denote by E X its average and by P(X ∈ E) the probability that X satisfies event E. We say that ε is a Bernoulli random variable if P(ε = +1) = P(ε = −1) = 1/2.
Representation theoretic preliminaries
Given t ∈ N let S t be the permutation group of {1, . . . , t}. The irreducible representations [λ] of S t are called Specht modules and are indexed by integer partitions of t, denoted as λ t. Such a partition is represented as a tuple λ = (λ 1 , ..., λ r ) ∈ N r , for some r ∈ N, with λ 1 · · · λ r and r i=1 λ i = t. Given d ∈ N let U (d) be the unitary group of C d . The polynomial irreducible representations V λ of U (d) are called Weyl modules and are indexed by integer partitions of any number t ∈ N into exactly d parts (some of which might be 0), denoted as λ (t, d). The dimension of the Weyl module V λ is given by the Weyl dimension formula
A particular vector space that carries representations of both S t and U (d) is C d ⊗t . The corresponding actions are defined as
The two actions commute, i.e. C d ⊗t decomposes into a direct sum of irreducible representations (irreps) of the product group S t × U (d). These irreps are just tensor products of an irrep of S t with an irrep of U (d). What is more, the corresponding representations of the group algebras of S t and U (d) are double commutants, implying that the decomposition is multiplicity free.
Theorem 2.1 (Schur-Weyl duality). Let S t and U (d) act on C d ⊗t as described above. The direct sum decomposition into irreducible representations of S t × U (d) is multiplicity free, and is given by
(2)
Define the quantum channel T (t) on (C d ) ⊗t as
where dU stands for the Haar measure on U (d). The channel T (t) is often referred to as a twirling channel. It is obviously covariant with respect to the action of U (d). Hence, denoting by W the isomorphism between the right and left hand sides of equation (2) above, Schur's Lemma implies that
where P λ is the projector onto
Let us make things slightly more explicit in the case t = 2. We have
where ∧ 2 (d) and ∨ 2 (d) are, respectively, the symmetric and anti-symmetric subspaces of
. The corresponding projectors are P ∧ 2 (d) = (1 + F )/2 and P ∨ 2 (d) = (1 − F )/2, where F denotes the so-called flip operator. And the action of T (2) can be explicitly written as, for any X ∈ L(d 2 ),
Fix a basis B = {|i } d−1 i=0 for C d (which we refer to as the computational basis). Let T be the transposition in this basis and denote by X Γ the partial transposition of X (i.e. X Γ = id ⊗ T(X)). It is easy to check that, for any X ∈ L(d 2 ),
Let us define the quantum channel T
By the preceding discussion, we know that T (1,1) (X) can be written as a linear combination of P Γ ∧ 2 (d) and P Γ ∨ 2 (d) . Now, 1 Γ = 1 and F Γ = d|ψ ψ|, where
|ii is the standard maximally entangled state with respect to B. So equivalently, T (1,1) (X) can be written as a linear combination of |ψ ψ| and Q = 1 − |ψ ψ|, which are orthogonal to one another. More specifically
3 Several channel approximation results
Approximating the twirling channel T (t)
Let t ∈ N be such that t d/2. The goal here is to show that the twirling channel T (t) , as defined by equation (3), can be approximated with 'few' Kraus operators sampled from a 'simple' probability measure. We will be able to prove such approximation in a strong sense, namely in one-to-infinity norm.
We will show the following result:
Theorem 3.1 generalizes [Aub09, Theorem 2] to t-designs for any t ∈ N rather than only for 1-designs. We actually follow the exact same proof strategy as that of [Aub09, Theorem 2]. The only additional technical lemma that we need in the case t > 1 is one that tells us that T (t) has a small (1 → ∞)-norm (a fact which is obvious for t = 1).
Lemma 3.2. The quantum channel T (t) is such that
Proof. By equation (4), the operator norm in question is just given by the inverse of the minimal dimension of an irrep V λ ,
Indeed, let us denote by λ * the partition minimizing
as T (t) begins with a pinching with respect to the direct sum decomposition (2). We go on to find a lower bound on m λ * using the formula (1). To this end we first note that λ * is a partition of t into d parts, so λ * i = 0 for all i > t. Noting that all the factors in the product in equation (1) are lower bounded by 1, and only keeping factors such that i ≤ t < j we get
As a final step we use that
where the last inequality is because d 2t by assumption and λ * i 1.
We then need the technical result below, which is an immediate corollary of [Aub09, Lemma 5] (which itself makes crucial use of Dudley's inequality and a duality argument for entropy numbers).
Proof. This follows directly from [Aub09, Lemma 5], applied with d t playing the role of d and U ⊗t i playing the role of U i , 1 i n.
With these two preliminary lemmas at hand, we are now in position to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let V 1 , . . . , V n be independent copies of U 1 , . . . , U n and let ε 1 , . . . , ε n be independent Bernoulli random variables. Setting
we then have
where the first inequality is by Jensen's inequality, the second equality is by symmetry, and the third inequality is by the triangle inequality. Hence, by Lemma 3.3, we get
where the second inequality is by Lemma 3.2 while the third inequality is by Jensen's inequality. Now, it is easy to check that, given X, α, β 0, if X α √ X + β, then X α 2 +α √ β. Therefore, we eventually obtain
And the latter quantity is smaller than /d t as soon as n is larger than C (td) t (t log d) 6 / 2 . To conclude, we just have to use Markov's inequality, which guarantees that, if E M /d t , then
This is exactly what we wanted to show (after relabelling 2 in and 4C in C).
Remark 3.4. Note that, up to a poly(t, log d) factor, the result of Theorem 3.1 is optimal, in the sense that it is impossible to approximate the twirling channel T (t) with less than order d t operators. This is true even if we only require -approximation in (1 → 1)-norm rather than 
where S(·) is the von Neumann entropy. In particular, if T is such that, for all ρ ∈ D(d ),
and hence necessarily
In the case of the channel T (t) on L(d t ), we know by Lemma 3.2 that, for all ρ ∈ D(d t ),
Approximating the twirling channel T (1,1)
The goal here is to show that the twirling channel T (1,1) , as defined by equation (5), can be approximated with 'few' Kraus operators sampled from a 'simple' probability measure. We will only be able to prove such approximation in a weaker sense than in the case of T (t) treated before, namely in one-to-one norm.
If µ is a 2-design on U (d), then, by equation (5), we have that
Theorem 3.5. Let 0 < < 1. Assume that the probability measure µ on U (d) is a 2-design, and let U 1 , . . . , U n be sampled independently from µ. There exists a universal constant C > 0 such that, if n Cd 2 (log d) 6 / 2 , then with probability at least 1/2, we have
The way we prove Theorem 3.5 is by first analysing separately the cases where the input state is the maximally entangled state or a state orthogonal to it. This is the content of Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 below. Proposition 3.6. Assume that the probability measure µ on U (d) is a 2-design, and let U 1 , . . . , U n be sampled independently from µ. Then,
Proof. We just have to notice that, for any U ∈ U (d), U ⊗Ū |ψ = |ψ . And thus,
as announced.
Proposition 3.7. Let 0 < < 1. Assume that the probability measure µ on U (d) is a 2-design, and let U 1 , . . . , U n be sampled independently from µ. There exists a universal constant C > 0 such that, if n Cd 2 (log d) 6 / 2 , then with probability at least 1/2, we have
In order to prove Proposition 3.7 we follow the same route as to prove Theorem 3.1. We thus begin by observing that T (1,1) has a small (1 → ∞)-norm on the orthogonal of the maximally entangled state, which is the analogue of Lemma 3.2 in the study of T (t) .
Lemma 3.8. The quantum channel T (1,1) is such that
Proof. By equation (6), we see that, for any state ρ orthogonal to |ψ ψ|, T (1,1) (ρ) = Q/(d 2 − 1), so that T (1,1) (ρ) ∞ = 1/(d 2 − 1).
We then need the technical result below, which is the analogue of Lemma 3.3 in the study of T (t) .
Lemma 3.9. Let U 1 , . . . , U n ∈ U (d). For ε 1 , . . . , ε n independent Bernoulli random variables, we have
Proof. This follows directly from [Aub09, Lemma 5], applied with d 2 − 1 playing the role of d and U i ⊗Ū i playing the role of U i , 1 i n.
With Lemmas 3.8 and 3.9 at hand it is straightforward to prove Proposition 3.7, starting from the same symmetrization trick than the one which allows to prove Theorem 3.1 from Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3. We therefore do not repeat the proof here.
So we can now combine Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 to get Theorem 3.5.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. By convexity of · 1 and extremality of pure states amongst all states, it is enough to prove that the result is true for all pure input states. Given |ϕ a unit vector, we can write it as |ϕ = α|ψ + β|ψ , where α = ψ|ϕ , |α| 2 + |β| 2 = 1 and |ψ is a unit vector orthogonal to |ψ . Defining
First, we know from Proposition 3.6 that ∆(|ψ ψ|) 1 = 0, while we know from Proposition 3.7 that, with probability at least 3/4, for any |ψ orthogonal to |ψ , ∆(|ψ ψ |) 1 d 2 ∆(|ψ ψ |) ∞ . Second, we know that we can write |ψ = X ⊗ 1|ψ for some X such that Tr(X) = 0 and X 2 = √ d. That way, since for any U ∈ U (d), U ⊗Ū |ψ = |ψ and U X ⊗Ū |ψ = U XU * ⊗ 1|ψ , we get
Now, we know from Theorem 3.1 (for t = 1) that, with probability at least 3/4, for any X such that
(actually as soon as n Cd(log d) 6 / 2 , hence a fortiori for n Cd 2 (log d) 6 / 2 ).
Putting everything together we eventually obtain that, with probability at least 1/2, for any |ϕ ,
which, up to re-labelling 3 /2 in , is exactly what we wanted to prove.
Remark 3.10. It can be shown that the result of Theorem 3.5 is optimal, up to a poly(log d) factor, just as the one of Theorem 3.1. Indeed, using again the result of [LW17, Section 5.1], together with Lemma 3.8, we see that, if a channelT (1,1) is -close to T (1,1) in (1 → 1)-norm, then it has to satisfy r(T (1,1) ) d 2 − 1 1− .
Approximating the twirling super-channel Θ
We are now interested in a slightly different kind of twirling, namely one that acts on channels rather than states. We thus define the quantum super-channel Θ on C d as
Similarly as before, we here want to show that Θ can be approximated by sampling 'few' unitaries from a 'simple' probability measure. We will be able to prove approximation in completely bounded one-to-one norm (also known as diamond norm) for all input channel. More precisely, denoting by id : L(d) → L(d) the identity map on L(d), we will show the following result:
Theorem 3.11. Let 0 < < 1. Assume that the probability measure µ on U (d) is a 2-design, and let U 1 , . . . , U n be sampled independently from µ. There exists a universal constant C > 0 such that, if n Cd 2 (log d) 6 / 2 , then with probability at least 1/2, we have, for all N ∈ C(d) and all ρ ∈ D(d 2 ),
Proof. By convexity of · 1 and extremality of pure states amongst all states, it is enough to prove that the result is true for all pure input states (and all input channels). Let N be a channel and |ϕ be a pure state, which we can write as |ϕ = X ⊗ 1|ψ for some X such that X 2 = √ d. Now, for any U ∈ U (d), X ⊗ U * |ψ = XŪ ⊗ 1|ψ , so that
Therefore, defining ∆ as in equation (7), we have
We now proceed exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3.5. First, by Proposition 3.6, ∆(|ψ ψ|) = 0, so that X ⊗ 1 ∆(|ψ ψ|) X * ⊗ 1 1 = 0.
Second, by Proposition 3.7, with probability at least 3/4, for any |ψ orthogonal to |ψ ,
where the first inequality is by Hölder inequality while the last inequality is simply recalling that X 2 = 1 2 = √ d. Third, any |ψ orthogonal to |ψ can be written as |ψ = Y ⊗ 1|ψ for some Y such that Tr(Y ) = 0 and Y 2 = √ d. Since for any U ∈ U (d), U ⊗Ū |ψ = |ψ and U Y ⊗Ū |ψ = U Y U * ⊗ 1|ψ , we then get
where the second equality is because X ⊗ 1|ψ = |ϕ = 1. Now on the one hand
And on the other hand, by Theorem 3.1 for t = 1 and / √ d instead of , we get that, for n Cd 2 (log d) 6 / 2 , with probability at least 3/4, for all Y such that
And thus, with probability at least 3/4, for any |ψ orthogonal to |ψ ,
Putting everything together, we obtain that, with probability at least 1/2, for any state σ (in particular for σ = id ⊗ N (|ψ ψ|)),
Inserting this into equation (9), and re-labelling 3 /2 in , yields exactly the claimed result.
An alternative formulation
Given a linear map acting on a normed vector space (that of either operators or superoperators in our case), it is natural to define its so-called induced norms. For a linear map M : L(d) → L(d) , the most relevant induced norm is the one-to-one norm, as well as its completely bounded counterpart (also known as diamond norm). These are defined as
where id k : L(k) → L(k) denotes the identity map on L(k). By extension, for a linear map Ξ : L(d) → L(d), the most relevant induced norm is the diamond-to-diamond norm, as well as its completely bounded counterpart (which we denote with a double diamond). These are defined as
where id k : L(k) → L(k) denotes the identity map on L(k).
Using these definitions, we can reformulate Theorems 3.1 and 3.11 as follows:
Corollary 3.12. Let 0 < < 1. Assume that the probability measure µ on U (d) is a t-design, and let U 1 , . . . , U n be sampled independently from µ. There exists a universal constant C > 0 such that, if n C(td) t (t log d) 6 / 2 , then with probability at least 1/2, we have
where
Corollary 3.13. Let 0 < < 1. Assume that the probability measure µ on U (d) is a 2-design, and let U 1 , . . . , U n be sampled independently from µ. There exists a universal constant C > 0 such that, if n Cd 2 (log d) 6 / 2 , then with probability at least 1/2, we have
For the applications in the next section, it is natural to define a k-bounded variant of the completely bounded one-to-one and diamond-to-diamond norms, i.e.
By the Schmidt decomposition it is clear that · ,d = · and · ,d 2 = · . What is more, it is well-known that, for any k d, · ,k k · 1→1 . We now prove a similar upper bound for · ,k in terms of · → .
Lemma 3.14. For any linear map Ξ : L(d) → L(d), we have
By concavity of the diamond norm, we can assume that M has a Choi matrix η M ∈ L(k 2 d 2 ) of rank one, i.e. η M = |ϕ M φ M | for some |ϕ M , |φ M ∈ C k 2 d 2 . Let us now write |ϕ M , |φ M ∈ C k 2 ⊗ C d 2 in their Schmidt decomposition:
where {|α i } 1 i k 2 , {|γ i } 1 i k 2 and {|β i } 1 i k 2 , {|ζ i } 1 i k 2 are orthonormal families in C k 2 and C d 2 respectively, and where {p i } 1 i k 2 , {q i } 1 i k 2 are subnormalized probability distributions. We can hence write
. We then have by the triangle inequality
To finish the proof, we then simply have to observe that
where the first inequality is by definition of the diamond-to-diamond norm and the second inequality is due to the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Application: Quantum non-malleable encryption against adversaries with small quantum memory
Information-theoretically secure quantum encryption has been studied extensively. In particular, the one-time variants of security goals such as confidentiality, authenticity and non-malleability have been defined for quantum encryption. When assessing the efficiency of a symmetric-key encryption scheme, there are three main figures of merit, the running time of the encryption and decryption algorithms, the ciphertext length and the key length. Here, we focus on the latter two figures of merit. Protocols have been designed which achieve the optimal scaling with respect to key length (up to log factors). More precisely, the results are as follows. The quantum one-time pad scheme, that encrypts a quantum system by applying a random element of the Pauli group, requires 2 log d bits of key [AMTD00] . The quantum authentication scheme presented in [BCG + 02] uses 2 log d + O(s) bits of key and log d + O(s) bits of ciphertext to achieve s bits of security. And non-malleable encryption with unitaries (hence with plaintext space and ciphertext space being the same) can be done with (4 + o(1)) log d bits of key [ABW09] . Here we describe a construction for non-malleable encryption without adversarial side information with unitaries using 2 log d + O(log log d) bits of key. In addition, our scheme has confidentiality against adversaries with side information. In other words, it is an alternative to the standard quantum one-time pad with the added property of non-malleability without side information at only an additive logarithmic cost in terms of key length.
One-time-secure quantum encryption
We begin by defining more rigorously the different cryptographic notions mentioned above. In the following, given a a finite set X , the notation E x∈X is used to denote the expectation value of a random variable x distributed uniformly on X . is called quantum encryption scheme if
The parameters log 2 |X |, log 2 d M and log 2 d C are called key length, message length and ciphertext length, respectively.
Given a quantum state σ ∈ D(d), define the quantum channel σ ∈ C(d) by σ (X) = Tr(X)σ.
Definition 4.2 (Indistinguishability of ciphertexts). A quantum encryption scheme has -indistinguishable ciphertexts, if there exists a quantum state σ
A quantum encryption scheme has -indistinguishable ciphertexts against adversaries without side information if the above inequality holds with the diamond norm replaced by the one-to-one norm. 
A quantum encryption scheme is -non-malleable against adversaries without side information, if there exists a quantum state σ ∈ D(d C ) such that for all Λ ∈ C(d C ) there exists p ∈ [0, 1] such that
Non-stabilized norms and adversaries without quantum side information
Any family of unitary matrices {U x } x∈X defines a quantum encryption scheme via the encryption channels Enc x (X) = U x XU * x and the decryption channels Dec x = Enc * x . For such unitary quantum encryption schemes, it is easy to see that -indistinguishability of ciphertexts implies that the family of unitaries is a 2 -approximate 1-design in diamond norm, and any -approximate 1-design in diamond norm gives rise to a quantum encryption scheme with -indistinguishable ciphertexts. The weaker property of -indistinguishability of ciphertexts against adversaries without side information and the -approximate 1-design property measured in one-to-one norm have the same relationship.
Similarly, if a unitary quantum encryption scheme is -non-malleable, then it is a 2approximate channel twirl in completely bounded diamond-to-diamond norm, and anapproximate channel twirl in completely bounded diamond-to-diamond norm gives rise to a quantum encryption scheme that is -non-malleable [ABW09, AM17] . Again, the weakernon-malleability against adversaries without side information and the -approximate channel twirl property measured in diamond-to-diamond norm have the same relationship.
The results in the previous section thus immediately imply the following for random unitary encryption schemes:
Theorem 4.4. Let 0 < < 1. Assume that the probability measure µ on U (d) is a 2-design, and let U 1 , . . . , U n be sampled independently from µ. There exists a universal constant C > 0 such that, if n Cd 2 (log d) 6 / 2 , then with probability at least 1/2, the quantum encryption scheme defined by the family of unitaries {U 1 , . . . , U n } has / √ dindistinguishable ciphertexts and is -non-malleable against adversaries without side information.
Proof. Let us define
To begin with notice that, if µ is a 2-design then it is a fortiori a 1-design. Hence by Corollary 3.12 (for t = 1 and / √ d instead of ) and Corollary 3.13, the probability that T (1) µ,n is an / √ d-approximate 1-design in one-to-one norm and the probability that Θ µ,n is an -approximate channel twirl in diamond-to-diamond norm are both at least 3/4 for n Cd 2 (log d) 6 / 2 . By the union bound, both properties hold simultaneously with probability at least 1/2. And as explained before, if this is so then the corresponding unitary quantum encryption scheme has / √ d-indistinguishable ciphertexts and is -nonmalleable against adversaries without side information.
Using the result of Lemma 3.14, relating the k-bounded diamond norm to the one-toone norm and the k-bounded double diamond norm to the diamond-to-diamond norm, we can immediately derive from Theorem 4.4 a generalisation of it that applies to the case where the adversary has side information, but in bounded quantity.
Corollary 4.5. Let 0 < < 1. Assume that the probability measure µ on U (d) is a 2-design, and let U 1 , . . . , U n be sampled independently from µ. There exists a universal constant C > 0 such that, if n Cd 2 (log d) 6 k 4 / 2 , then with probability at least 1/2, the quantum encryption scheme defined by the family of unitaries {U 1 , . . . , U n } has /k √ dindistinguishable ciphertexts and is -non-malleable against adversaries with k-bounded side information.
Proof. Let T
(1) µ,n , Θ µ be defined as in equation (10). We have shown in the proof of Theorem 4.4 that, for n Cd 2 (log d) 6 / 2 , with probability larger than 1/2,
Now by Lemma 3.14, we know that this implies that
Hence redefining as k 2 , we get that, for n Cd 2 (log d) 6 k 4 / 2 , with probability larger than 1/2, T
(1) µ,n is an /k √ d-approximate 1-design in k-bounded diamond norm and Θ µ,n is an -approximate channel twirl in k-bounded double diamond norm. And if this is so then the corresponding unitary quantum encryption scheme has /k √ d-indistinguishable ciphertexts and is -non-malleable against adversaries with k-bounded side information.
A note on efficiency
While our scheme is more efficient in terms of key length and in terms of encryption and decryption given the element of the design that needs to be applied (if instantiated with an efficiently implementable 2-design, such as e.g. the Clifford group), specifying the randomly chosen subset of the exact 2-design is inefficient. This is a problem shared by all schemes based on the sub-sampling technique, i.e. in particular by the ones constructed in [HLSW04] and [ABW09] . To construct efficiently specifiable approximate designs in the weak norms we consider, that are still smaller than approximate designs in the diamond norm, additional new techniques seem to be necessary. A possible approach would be to, e.g., analyse random quantum circuits with respect to these norms.
